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This policy update’s Special Focus looks at the 
situation in the Mediterranean, where SAR vessels 
have been caught in stand-offs with EU member 
states over the disembarkation and relocation of 
asylum seekers. Since the end of 2018, so-called 
“temporary arrangements” have been implemented 
aiming to relocate migrants rescued at sea to those 
member states willing to cooperate. In an effort to 
move away from this problematic, ad-hoc approach, 
the Commission proposes setting up a contingency 
plan that would provide a more structural 
mechanism for relocating asylum seekers to EU 
member states. 
Difficult winter conditions on the Greek islands are 
prompting a number of NGOs to (again) call on Greek 
authorities to relocate migrants to better equipped 
reception centres on the mainland. At the same time, 
advocacy efforts are being made to improve housing 
conditions on the islands, where the refugee camps, 
due to the geographical restrictions of the EU-Turkey deal, 
have long surpassed their maximum capacity.
The restriction put on the migrants’ movement is also a 
topic of debate in the context of increased border 
management cooperation between France and the UK. 
Faced with a rise in the number of people crossing the 
Channel, the British Home Office has increased border 
surveillance activities. These activities, and the UK Home 
Secretary’s rhetoric in respect to the Channel crossings, 
have been widely criticised by NGOs and legal 
commentators.
In the Closer Look section, the European Alternatives To 
Detention (ATD) Network describes the progress made 
towards decreasing the use of immigration detention and 
offering alternatives to decision-makers. The aim of these 
alternatives is to establish migration management systems 
that produce better outcomes for migrants, communities 
and governments.
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 SPECIAL FOCUS 
  ​Temporary Disembarkation Arrangements​.  
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Immigration Detention ​. 
Over the course of the past few months, Search and Rescue (SAR) NGOs have faced                             
considerable obstacles to their activities. This Special Focus gives an overview of the latest                           
challenges in the Mediterranean, including disembarkation disputes, the criminalisation of                   
SAR NGOs and an uncertain future for Operation Sophia. A second section analyses the                           
ad-hoc nature of current disembarkation and relocation arrangements, and the                   
Commission’s initiative for a more structural contingency plan. 
SAR vessels are still being prevented from docking in Italian and Maltese ports and                           
disembarking the people they have rescued at sea. Among others, the NGO vessels                         
Sea-Watch 3 and Professor Albrecht Penck​, which together had rescued 49 migrants, were                         
denied permission to access Maltese waters or dock in a European port for 19 days over the                                 
course of late December and early January. EU member states were caught in a ​stand-off as                               
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governments were reluctant to come forward with relocation spaces. Civil society                     
organisations strongly ​condemned ​member states’ inaction against the background of                   
quickly deteriorating ​conditions ​on board of the vessels. The standoff only ended after an ad                             
hoc agreement was reached by ​eight member states (Germany, France, the Netherlands,                       
Portugal, Ireland, Romania, Luxembourg and Italy) to relocate the migrants involved in this                         
incident. In addition, another 224 out of a previously saved group of 249 and another 131                               
migrants that were already in Malta were also relocated. In a later incident, at the end of                                 
January, the ​Sea Watch 3 was only allowed to dock in Catania when an agreement was                               
found after two weeks of negotiations between seven member states to take in the migrants                             
on board. One day earlier, the ​European Court of Human Rights had issued an interim                             
measure ordering Italy to provide ​basic supplies​, medical care and legal assistance to those                           
on board. 
Another serious challenge faced by SAR NGOs is the increasing ​criminalisation of their                         
activities since the summer of 2017. In a recent instance, after the Sea Watch 3 had docked in                                   
Catania in January, ​Italy threatened ​criminal charges against its crew for “favouring                       
illegal immigration”. Although the crew was cleared of these ​charges​, their ship continues to                           
be ​blocked in Catania’s harbour on grounds of alleged “technical irregularities” such as                         
navigation safety and environmental laws. Since mid-January, the SAR vessel ​Proactiva                     
Open Arms has been blocked from leaving the Barcelona harbour. The ship was accused by                             
Spain's public works ministry of not taking the migrants it had rescued to the nearest port                               
possible. A number of​ ​Catalan political parties​ have called for the ship’s immediate release. 
The SAR vessel Aquarius has faced similar challenges. After the ship was stripped first of its                               
Gibraltarian and then of its ​Panamanian flag last year, the NGO ​SOS Meditérranée tried to                             
find another country under whose flag the ship could sail. Following an ultimately                         
unsuccessful struggle​, the organisation stopped chartering the Aquarius at the end of                       
January. In a review of these incidents, ​Human Rights at Sea found that Italy had exerted                               
undue pressure on Gibraltar and Panama to withdraw their licenses. According to the                         
report, “politically-motivated State influence [prevailed] over well-publicised humanitarian               
search and rescue (SAR) activities at sea”. In addition, the crew of the Aquarius has also                               
been the focus of an ​investigation into improper ​waste dumping​. The ship itself is held in the                                 
port of Marseille because of these accusations. ​MSF called the seizure of the vessel “a                             
disproportionate and unfounded measure, purely aimed at further criminalising lifesaving                   
medical-humanitarian action at sea”. The organisation intends to submit an appeal to                       
Italian review courts. The increasing criminalisation has been met with severe ​criticism by                         
NGOs​ and the EU’s​ ​Fundamental Rights Agency​ (FRA). 
Because of this repressive climate, there are currently no NGO ships operating in the                           
Central Mediterranean. As ​research has shown, NGOs had taken on a considerable share of                           
the SAR activities in the Mediterranean, rescuing up to 40% of all migrants assisted in 2017                               
and 2018. Their gradual disappearance and the ensuing gap in SAR activities has led to                             
increasingly dangerous situations for migrants. ​Mortality rates have also risen sharply. In                       
January alone, an estimated 170 migrants are believed to have died or gone missing in two                               
separate ​shipwrecks​. Migrants have also been subjected to increasing ​interceptions by the                       
Libyan Coast Guard and returns to Libya. After having been rescued by a merchant vessel,                             
another 150 people are reported to have been returned to ​detention in Libya in the same                               
month. Three weeks later, on 12 February​, a second merchant ship is reported to have                             
returned an additional ​150 people to Libya. Migrants continue to suffer from                       
life-threatening conditions​ and gross human rights​ ​violations​ in ​Libyan​ ​detention centres. 
Meanwhile, following on from ​earlier ​discussions​, a decision was reached in late December                         
to ​extend Operation Sophia’s mandate until the end of March. However, Italian Minister of                           
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the Interior ​Matteo Salvini again made the mission’s continuation conditional on changing                       
the ​rules for disembarking migrants. One month later, in late January, ​Germany decided to                           
discontinue its support of Operation Sophia, reportedly because of ​Italy’s reluctance to                       
allow the disembarkation of migrants in its ports and sending the German navy to parts of                               
the Mediterranean with few migrant crossings. The naval mission’s ​mandate focuses on                       
disrupting smuggling and human trafficking in the Mediterranean. It has often been                       
criticised for its ​limited scope and for its attempts to curb migration at the ​expense of                               
important human rights principles. According to Amnesty International, Operation Sophia                   
has led to ​smugglers switching from more stable wooden boats to cheaper and disposable                           
rubber boats, since the naval mission routinely destroys the vessels used by smugglers. This                           
has also made Mediterranean crossings even more perilous. 
These problems are part of the larger debates taking place in the context of the Dublin                               
Regulation reforms, and in particular, the questions of how to organise a fair                         
responsibility-sharing over asylum applications among member states. The Commission’s                 
proposal for a Dublin IV Regulation includes a mandatory relocation mechanism. This                       
mechanism was further extended by the European Parliament in its ​report on the file.                           
However, the negotiations have reached an impasse in the ​Council​. Italy’s refusal to allow                           
ships to dock and disembark in Italian ports has been interpreted as part of a ​deliberate                               
strategy aimed at pushing other member states into accepting a mandatory relocation                       
mechanism. As highlighted by ​analysts​, aside from the grave humanitarian concerns they                       
raise, Italy’s actions are actually detrimental to its own long-term interests. In the                         
short-run, the refusal to disembark migrants in Italian ports could lead to the opening of a                               
port in Spain or France on a one-off basis. On a broader level, however, Italy’s actions are                                 
worsening diplomatic tensions on the file. In that way, they undermine opportunities to find                           
a viable, structural solution for the responsibility-sharing question. 
Faced with the political stand-off, the ​Commission called for the introduction of a “​safety                           
net​” for times of “particular pressure” in December. In the absence of a structural solution in                               
the context of the Dublin discussions, this mechanism should, in the meantime, “serve as a                             
bridge” and guarantee “real support” to a concerned member state. During the February                         
informal Justice and Home Affairs meeting, ​Germany reiterated its support for a temporary                         
arrangement that should cover the whole Mediterranean and called on more member states                         
to join this coalition of the willing. ​Commissioner Avramopoulos repeated that a more                         
structural scheme could only work if a high number of member states participated, yet                           
declined to comment on how many and which member states would join the initiative. 
Civil society organisations have also been calling for a more structural solution to the                           
disembarkation and relocation of migrants, emphasizing the plight of the individuals stuck                       
on board the vessels during member states negotiations. ​ECRE provided a series of                         
recommendations as to how such structural ​mechanisms could work. Similarly, ​SOS                     
Méditerranée called for “a common, predictable and coordinated mechanism… as a matter                       
of emergency”. Other organisations emphasised the need for safe and swift ​disembarkation                       
policies and increased ​resettlement pledges​. ​UNHCR highlighted the importance of                   
simultaneously “increasing coordinated multi-state rescue, restoring rapid disembarkation               
in a place of safety, and lifting impediments to the work of NGO rescue vessels”. In early                                 
February, in a joint statement, ​fifty NGOs criticised the “painful, drawn-out debates” around                         
ports of disembarkation and called on member state governments to adopt predictable                       
disembarkation arrangements and end returns to Libya. At the same time, and as similarly                           
highlighted by civil society ​voices​, whilst interim measures are urgently needed, it is                         
important that efforts towards creating EU-wide solidarity on responsibility-sharing over                   




  UK-French Border Management Cooperation​. 
 ​  Asylum ​. 
In January, the United Kingdom and France signed a ​joint action plan to prevent migrants                             
from crossing the Channel between the two countries. The agreement was adopted in the                           
wake of a recent increase in the number of migrants trying to reach the UK using small                                 
dinghies and fishing vessels. The action plan intensifies cooperation between the two                       
countries on border management, sea crossings, deterrence campaigns, and returns under                     
the Dublin Regulation. In doing so, it commits the UK to providing EUR 7 million in funding to                                   
France for so-called “reinforced preventive security measures”. The ​declaration also                   
mentions an increasing use of CCTV footage, air, boat and land patrols and the criminal                             
prosecution of migrants that cross the Channel by boat. 
  
The document is the most recent product of a growing ​militarised surveillance of the border                             
between the two countries, with the ​British navy being involved in intercepting vessels                         
carrying migrants since the beginning of this year. ​Sajid Javid​, the UK Home Secretary,                           
declared the migrant crossings “a major incident”. According to ​Home Office figures, a total                           
of 539 migrants had attempted to travel to the UK in 2018, 42% of which were intercepted by                                   
French border control before reaching British shores. Javid also questioned why “genuine”                       
asylum seekers would not have ​sought asylum in France already and, in the House of                             
Commons, stated that asylum should be claimed in the ​first safe country reached. He added                             
that the failure to do so in France would be taken into account when assessing the                               
credibility of an asylum claim. 
 
NGOs and other ​commentators were highly critical of the Home Secretary’s choice of words                           
and accused him of an ​overreaction​. The ​Refugee Council​, which had already called on the                             
UK government to open more safe and regular ​routes​, stated that prejudging asylum claims                           
in such a way was “a blatant breach of international law”. ​Immigration lawyers underlined                           
that the Geneva Convention contained no obligation that a refugee should claim asylum in                           
the first country reached. ​Steve Peers similarly stressed that EU legislation such as the                           
Dublin Regulation places no responsibility on asylum seekers to apply in certain countries,                         







  Winter on the Aegean Islands​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Children and Youth ​.  
Three years after the conclusion of the ​EU-Turkey Statement​, the situation for migrants on                           
the Aegean islands continues to be precarious. As addressed in a previous ​EPIM update​,                           
asylum seekers who have arrived on the Greek islands after 20 March 2016 are not allowed                               
to leave the islands until their asylum application has been assessed. This ​geographical                         
restriction was implemented to facilitate returns to Turkey, one of the ​main pillars of the                             
EU-Turkey Statement. Since May 2017, vulnerable people, as defined by ​Greek asylum law​,                         
are exempted from this geographical restriction. This section looks at two sets of structural                           
problems on the islands that have returned as a source of concern during winter: (i) general                               
accommodation conditions and (ii) the treatment of vulnerable asylum seekers. 
 
To begin with, the start of the winter brought renewed concerns about the lack of adequate                               
housing conditions on the islands. Twenty NGOs, including the ​Greek Council for Refugees​,                         
repeated earlier calls to both the Greek as well as EU authorities to relocate all asylum                               
seekers to better equipped reception centres. In reaction to the death of a 24-year old man                               
from Cameroon in Camp Moira on Lesvos in early January, ​local NGOs as well as the Council                                 
of Europe ​General Rapporteur on Reception Conditions for Refugees and Migrants urged to                         
immediately improve reception conditions. On the island of ​Samos a group of migrants                         
staged a public protest to draw attention to their poor living conditions. ​Refugee Support                           
Aegean noted that the situation on Samos “reached the edge” in late February due to                             
overcrowded reception centres, lack of infrastructure and rising xenophobic tensions on the                       
island. Greek Migration Minister ​Dimitris Vitsas acknowledged that the situation in Samos                       
is currently the most worrisome, and that 2000 people need to be moved from the islands as                                 
soon as possible. ​ECRE and the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), with support of                           
the Greek Refugee Council, filed a legal complaint against Greece with the European                         
Committee of Social Rights. This ​complaint specifically focuses on migrant children and                       
points out how the Greek authorities continuously and systematically fail to provide                       
sufficient accommodation facilities for these children. In combination with the lack of an                         
effective guardianship system for unaccompanied minors, this has led children to be                       
exposed to severe protection risks, including homelessness and detention. 
 
Greece has been allocated a total of EUR 509 million under the 2014-2020 ​Asylum, Migration                             
and Integration Fund (AMIF) and the ​Internal Security Fund (ISF), which includes funding                         
for improving accommodation conditions. On top of this, EUR 267 million of the emergency                           
assistance budgets of both funds has been earmarked for Greece. A recent ​evaluation by                           
ECRE and UNCHR of the AMIF found that Greece actually received the largest total payment                             
in AMIF emergency assistance between 2015 and 2017, amounting to EUR 114.5 million.                         
However, there have been ongoing ​concerns about how these EU funds are spent. The                           
European Court of Auditors announced in January that it will conduct an audit of five                             
‘hotspots’ in Greece (Kos, Lesvos, Chios, Samos and Leros) to assess whether the funds have                             
been spent appropriately and achieved their objectives.  
 
In addition, further concerns were raised regarding the special regulations that have been                         
adopted for the most vulnerable asylum seekers on the islands. According to ​Oxfam​, these                           
regulations are failing to identify and assist particularly vulnerable people such as                       
pregnant women, victims of human trafficking and unaccompanied children and youth.                     
This failure is a result of flawed and continuously changing screening procedures, and a                           
lack of qualified staff to carry out vulnerability assessments. In response to the report,                           
Minister​ ​Dimitris Vitsas​ vowed to send more qualified medical professionals to the islands.  
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  Discussions on ‘Golden Visas’​. 
At the end of January, the European Commission released its long-awaited ​evaluation of the                           
so-called golden visa schemes. Also known as ‘Residence by Investment’ (RBI) or ‘Citizenship                         
by Investment’ (CBI), these schemes give individuals the opportunity to bypass regular visa                         
and citizenship procedures by buying government bonds or investing in property. At the                         
start of this year, three EU member states ran Citizenship by Investment programmes                         
(Bulgaria, Cyprus and Malta) whilst a number of EU member states had Residence by                           
Investment programmes. As discussed in a previous ​EPIM update​, these programmes have                       
been a subject of long-standing debate. While there have been ​precedents of closer                         
involvement of EU institutions, citizenship policies touch on sensitive issues of state                       
sovereignty and remain a largely national competence. Yet, given free movement and other                         
rights derived from EU citizenship, which complements member state citizenship, the                     
programmes are highly relevant from an EU law perspective, too. Last year the ​European                           
Parliamentary Research Service ​and ​Transparency International and Global Witness                 
released reports raising concerns about the poor accountability within these schemes, the                       
lack of transparency and links to corruption, bribery and money laundering. 
The Commission report of January highlights similar abuse and vulnerability concerns. It                       
finds that both schemes in general lack adequate security checks of applicants and that the                             
information shared by member states about the applications is insufficient and not                       
transparent. RBI schemes, for instance, often failed to meet the conditions set out in the                             
Long Term Residence Directive which require third country nationals to have lived in a                           
member state for five continuous years before qualifying for long term residency. CBI                         
schemes, on the other hand, were sensitive to being misused for the purpose of                           
circumventing EU anti-money laundering rules and evade taxes. Moving forward, the report                       
proposes continuous monitoring of the schemes, and the creation of a member state expert                           
group. This group will be tasked with setting up an information and consultation exchange                           
system and with developing a common set of security checks for CBI schemes. 
The Commission report received mixed responses. ​Some legal scholars argued that the                       
Commission raised several significant issues such as the lack of oversight on non-public                         
bodies involved in the schemes. ​Others ​argued, however, that the Commission ignored the                         
economic benefits of CBI schemes, and overstepped its power by meddling in national                         
competences on nationality and citizenship. 
NGOs such as ​Transparency International and Global Witness criticized the lack of concrete,                         
adequate measures and called on the Commission to suspend all schemes until their                         
potential security risks would be cleared. Similar responses were voiced in ​The Guardian​.                         
Critics such as Green MEP ​Sven Giegold described the proposed solutions as “half-hearted”,                         
and called for new European legislation and binding minimum standards. The Organized                       
Crime and Corruption Reporting Project ​(OCCRP) questioned why the Commission removed                     
its toughest demands, such as the refusal of applications from any individual on a UN or EU                                 
sanction lists, as outlined in earlier leaked drafts of the report they had seen. 
Reactions also came in from EU member states administering RBI and CBI schemes. ​Malta                           
argued that CBI and RBI applicants were actually subject to “rigorous due diligence checks                           
and investigations”. The ​Bulgarian Ministry of Justice announced that it would eliminate                       
CBI schemes. Reasons to cancel the schemes were attributed to a lack of investment and                             




  Upgraded EU Visa Information System​. 
  Children and Youth ​.  
At the beginning of February, the European Parliament’s ​Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE)                       
voted in favour of a number of changes to the EU ​Visa Information System (VIS)​. This follows                                 
on from the ​Commission proposal last year to ​upgrade the VIS to be interoperable with                             
other EU information systems (see developments on the interoperability regulations below).                     
The VIS is used in the Schengen area by national immigration authorities to examine and                             
decide on visa applications, as well as by border guards to verify the identity of a visa                                 
holder. The present reforms include mandatory security checks across all EU databases to                         
prevent identity fraud. Moreover, long-stay visas, including so-called ‘golden visas’ (see the                       
political developments section above), as well as residence permits will now be included in                           
the VIS. The age for retaining biometrical data such as fingerprints and facial images will be                               
lowered to six years. As a last development, Europol and other law enforcement agencies                           
will be granted greater access to VIS data. 
 
These changes were criticised by European data protection authorities, as cited by                       
Statewatch​. Amongst others, they feared that they would “fail to meet basic data protection                           
and fundamental rights standards” as protected under EU data protection law. According to                          
Statewatch​, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) was also critical of the                       
Commission’s proposal with regard to screening rules covering age, sex, nationality;                     
country of residence; destination; first entry; purpose of travel; and current occupation. The                         
EDPS warned that profiling techniques of this kind pose “serious technical, legal and ethical                           
questions, related to their transparency and accuracy”. Moreover, ​data protection                   
authorities have been highly critical of the fingerprinting of children and youth in this                           
context. They are doubtful whether the new VIS rules are in line with considerations about                             
the child’s best interests and with necessity and proportionality checks. 
 
  New Schengen Information System (SIS) rules​. 
 ​  Asylum ​. 
Three new regulations governing the Schengen Information System (SIS), the EU’s                     
information sharing system for security and border management, entered into force at the                         
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end of 2018. This follows on from the ​European Council’s adoption of a Commission proposal                             
to strengthen the SIS in November. More specifically, there are two amending regulations –                           
one on the use of the SIS in the field of ​police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,                                   
and one in the field of ​border checks – as well as a new regulation on the use of the SIS in the                                             
context of ​return operations. Rules that apply immediately relate to member states’ use of                           
the SIS for all terrorism-related offences, as well as stronger data protection rules in line                             
with the ​General Data Protection Regulation and the Police Directive on data protection. In                           
a subsequent phase, additional rules will come into effect that govern: obligatory alerts in                           
the SIS for return decisions; alerts on wanted criminals; preventive alerts on missing                         
children and persons in need of protection; and entry bans for third country nationals. The                             
new regulations also provide ​greater access for EU agencies to data retained in the SIS. In                               
this regard, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) plans to establish a                           
technical interface that ​links to the SIS and that will issue alerts in case of hits in the SIS                                     
database. 
 
Member states have been accused in the past of instrumentalising the SIS for political                           
reasons, thereby unduly restricting free movement rights. A high-profile example is the                       
case of ​Lyudmyla Kozlovska​, a Ukrainian national living in Poland and, in the context of her                               
work as president of the Open Dialogue Foundation, a critic of the Polish government.                           
Poland had entered an ​alert in the system, preventing Kozlovska from entering the                         
Schengen Zone without official explanation. She was subsequently deported back to                     
Ukraine and her case remains unresolved until now. The alleged silencing of this                         
well-known and vocal civil society actor and possible political misuse of the SIS continues to                             
be​ ​petitioned​ and debated by​ ​civil society​,​ ​legal commentators​ and​ ​MEPs​. 
 
  The Interoperability Regulation: Political Agreement​. 
 ​  Asylum ​. 
The Parliament and Council reached a political agreement at the beginning of February on                           
the ​Commission’s proposal for a framework for interoperability between EU information                     
systems. This concerns two new regulations that now will need to be formally adopted by                             
the European Parliament and Council: ​one on interoperability in the fields of police and                           
judicial cooperation, asylum and migration and the ​other on interoperability in the fields of                           
borders and visas. The regulations will give border guards and immigration officials                       
greater access to personal and immigration data across ​different systems​. Among other                       
things, they will be able to use a European search portal to check biometric as well as                                 
biographical data of non-EU citizens. According to the ​Commission​, the regulations will not                         
change access rules to such information and therefore protect fundamental rights. 
 
The new rules would cover the already existing, centralised ​Schengen Information System                       
(SIS), ​Eurodac​, and ​Visa Information System (VIS). Moreover, they would also apply to three                           
new systems, among them the yet to be adopted ​European Criminal Records System for                           
Third Country Nationals (ECRIS-TCN) and the already adopted ​Entry/Exit System (EES) and                       
European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS). The Commission’s                 
initiative on interoperability is part of an ongoing ​restructuring of EU databases in the field                             
of justice and home affairs which aims to improve connections between different                       
information systems. ​Statewatch has raised concerns that this would in fact create a                         
centralised EU database and affect non-EU citizens in a discriminatory manner. It also                         
raised concerns about the risk of conflating terrorism threats with migration control. The                         
European Data Protection Supervisor similarly warned, in early 2018, that the                     
interoperability of large-scale EU databases was “liable to have profound legal and societal                         
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consequences”. Given the scale of the data retained in the interoperable databases, a data                           
breach could have a profound impact on the fundamental rights of a considerable number                           
of individuals. 
 
  Progress on Frontex Reform​. 
 ​  Asylum ​. 
The European Parliament and Council have adopted their negotiating positions on the                       
Commission’s ​proposal for a reform of the European Border and Coast Guard (‘Frontex’).                         
Points of discussion during the negotiations will likely relate to the size and roll out of the                                 
agency’s standing corps as well as to the EU’s cooperation with third countries on the return                               
of so-called “irregular migrants”. 
 
The Parliament ​report includes a number of amendments to the original legislative                       
proposal. With regards to the creation of a standing corps of 10,000 operational staff, the                             
Parliament proposes a gradual roll-out. 5,000 staff should be operational two years after                         
the regulation would come into effect and the standing corps’ full capacity would be                           
reached after five years. Whilst the ​Parliament expressed its general support for                       
strengthened cooperation with third countries on returns, it also introduced several                     
safeguards to ensure a respect for fundamental rights during return interventions. These                       
safeguards stipulate, for instance, that Frontex would have to conclude a status agreement                         
with the third country in question before an intervention, or that the return destination                           
would be deemed safe by UNHCR. 
 
In the Council, the Frontex reform proposal created discord on a number of issues. As                             
follows from an earlier ​leaked document​, concerns related to the size and roll-out of the                             
corps. A ​negotiating position was agreed to in late February. The ​Council ​proposes to roll out                               
the 10,000 operation staff until 2027. In that way, it would extend the envisaged timeline                             
even further than the Parliament. The Council also proposes for the Commission to carry                           
out a mid-term review of the overall number and composition of the corps. Following the                             
review’s discussion by the Council and Parliament, the Commission would then confirm or                         
amend the number, composition and member states’ contribution to the corps by March                         
2024. 
 
In the negotiations, the Parliament and Council will have to find an agreement on a number                               
of difficult issues. In particular, the initially proposed timeline for making the 10,000                         
standing corps operational as well as its total size has been assessed as a challenge by                               
commentators​. Moreover, the Frontex reform has given rise to ​sovereignty concerns among                       
member states, in particular in relation to the proposal’s aim of ​centralising                       
decision-making power with the Commission instead of the Council. This would apply, for                         
instance, to emergency situations in which, according to the original proposal, it would be                           
up to the Commission, not the Council, to decide whether Frontex should intervene. 
 
More generally, the Frontex reform has also been criticised as forming part of a wider EU                               
strategy of externalisation and pushing responsibilities to third countries with dubious                     
human rights records. In this respect, ​Migreurop has called for greater scrutiny of Frontex’s                           
activities in third countries by the European Parliament. The EU’s ​Fundamental Rights                       
Agency has also issued suggestions on how to strengthen the overall fundamental rights                         






 SELECTED ECJ CASE LAW & LEGAL ACTIONS 
  
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​ ​  Mobile EU citizens​ .​  ​  Children and Youth ​. 
Case ​C‑661/17, M.A., S.A., A.Z. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal, Minister for                       
Justice and Equality, Attorney General, 23 January 2019   
This case concerned a family of three who had resided lawfully in the UK for several years.                                 
Upon the expiry of their visas, they travelled to Ireland where they applied for asylum. In                               
line with the Dublin Regulation, the Irish authorities issued a take back request to the UK. In                                 
subsequent proceedings against the transfer decision, the family appealed to Article 17 of                         
the Dublin Regulation (“Discretionary Clauses”) according to which member states may                     
decide to examine an asylum application themselves, even if they would not normally be                           
responsible for it. The family cited, in this respect, health concerns of two family members                             
as well as the pending withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The case appeared before the High                                   
Court of Ireland which referred several questions to the EU Court of Justice. ​With respect to                               
the implications of the pending Brexit, first, the Court of Justice reiterated, as it had done                               
earlier in ​RO ​(relating to the continued execution of European Arrest Warrants), that EU                           
law, in casu ​the Dublin Regulation, continued to apply in full in the UK until the UK’s actual                                   
withdrawal from the EU. Accordingly, the pending Brexit did not oblige a member state to                             
use the discretionary clause and examine an asylum application for which the UK was                           
designated as ‘responsible’. The Court also noted that the presumption of respect for                         
fundamental rights enshrined in EU law continued, similarly, to apply in full force in the UK                               
until its withdrawal. Further Court conclusions reinforced states’ discretion in choosing                     
whether or not to apply the Article 17 discretionary clauses. Among other things, it ruled                             
that considerations relating to the best interests of the child do not oblige a member state to                                 
examine an asylum application for which it is not responsible under the Dublin Regulation.  
Case​ ​C-322/17​,​ ​Eugen Bogatu v Minister for Social Protection, 7 February 2019  
This case concerned the situation of Mr Bogatu, a Romanian national, who has lived in                             
Ireland since 2003. He submitted a claim for family benefits for his two children, residing in                               
Romania, with the Irish authorities. His claim was approved by the Irish authorities, except                           
for a period between April 2010 and January 2013 during which Mr Bogatu received                           
non-contributory unemployment benefits. According to the Irish authorities, Mr Bogatu did                     
not, at that time, fulfil the conditions to receive family benefits for his children in Romania,                               
since he was neither employed nor receiving contributory benefits in Ireland. Mr Bogatu                         
challenged this decision with reference to EU law. In the context of proceedings which                           
appeared before the High Court of Ireland, the CJEU was asked to clarify, first, whether                             
Regulation 884/2004 on the coordination of social security system requires a claimant with                         
children living in other EU member states to be employed in order to be eligible to receive                                 
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family benefits, and second, whether the Regulation requires the claimant to be a                         
beneficiary of cash benefits as a result of employment. The Court established that the                           
Regulation entitles a person to family benefits in accordance with the national legislation of                           
the respective member state. This entitlement also covers family members residing in other                         
EU member states, and such family members should be treated as if they were residing in                               
the same member state as the claimant. The Court found that the Regulation does not                             
require a person to have a specific employment or other status. Accordingly, it was not                             
necessary for a person such as Mr Bogatu, either to be employed or in receipt of cash                                 
benefits in order to be able to receive family benefits for his children living in another                               
member state.  
 
Other relevant case law 
Case​ ​C‑492/18 PPU​, TC, 12 February 2019 
 
 A CLOSER LOOK FROM... 
  ​Progress towards reducing Immigration Detention​. 
  Immigration Detention ​.​ ​ . 
By Jem Stevens, ​International Detention Coalition 
What progress are we making towards reducing immigration detention? This was the main                         
question discussed during the fourth ‘​European Alternatives to Detention (ATD) Network​’                     
meeting in Brussels in February. 
As EU policies are encouraging more and longer detention to increase returns and prevent                           
secondary movement, several member states are planning to expand the use of detention.                         
Effective opposition to detention is becoming more difficult. Can civil society alternatives to                         
detention, based on high quality case management, show that engagement with migrants in                         
the community works better for everyone? 
Set up in March 2017, the European ATD Network is a space to strategize for a future that is                                     
different from the looming dystopia of widening mass detention in Europe. To achieve                         
reform that moves away from immigration detention, we need to make it a political problem                             
and provide solutions. The network links NGO partners running case management ATD                       
pilots in Bulgaria, Cyprus, Poland and the UK, with the International Detention Coalition                         
(IDC) and the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM).                     
We started by developing a shared theory of change, setting out how implementing small                           
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alternative pilots in four countries could build momentum to work towards the expansion of                           
alternatives and a reduction of detention. We sought to address key barriers in Europe: a                             
lack of practice and evidence on engagement-based ATD and limited buy-in from NGOs for                           
solutions-based advocacy around alternatives. Two years into the process, the network is                       
seeing real progress: the European Commission is putting significant political investment                     
into alternatives involving civil society, while a range of regional, national and local                         
stakeholders are increasingly exploring, promoting and collaborating on ATD. 
And we now have evidence to prove that ATD works: EPIM’s first independent ​evaluation of                             
the pilot projects indicates that 97% of migrants stayed engaged – in countries with often                             
high overall rates of secondary movement - and that case management had a positive                           
impact on case resolution in 88% of cases. The report‘s qualitative findings help us frame the                               
discussion with decision-makers to address the full complexity of strengthening                   
immigration systems, rather than being limited to crude metrics of short-term return                       
numbers. Less obvious achievements are equally significant. The network has become a hub                         
of learning for trusted allies and beyond. During the network meeting in Brussels, we had an                               
exchange with NGOs from many other countries that are working on ATD as a strategy.                             
National civil society engagement is crucial for getting governments on board with                       
alternatives that can really lead to detention reduction. One such example is the UK, where                             
strategic campaigning linked with advocacy around an ATD pilot has been successful in                         
achieving change. In July 2018, the government made a high-profile commitment to fund                         
additional NGO-led alternatives projects as part of detention reform. This has already led to                           
a 40% reduction in the number of people in detention. 
There are many ongoing challenges, not least the question of how we can develop                           
alternatives in complex political contexts and work with migrants towards resolving their                       
cases. Despite this, the level of confidence at our network meeting was high. At a time of                                 
unprecedented pressure, there was a sense that this growing movement on alternatives                       
could be a catalyst for change towards migration management systems that produce better                         
outcomes for migrants, communities and governments without relying on detention.  
 
 FACTS & FIGURES 
      
 UNHCR statistics on arrivals​. 
  Asylum ​. 
Recent data by the UNHCR​ ​reveal​ the following trends: 
● 7,685 sea arrivals have been recorded since the beginning of the year. 235 have arrived in                               
Italy, while 2,530 have arrived in Greece and 4,835 have arrived in Spain; 
● So far, an estimated 207 people have been reported dead or missing in 2019; 
● In Italy, the majority of refugees come from Tunisia, Eritrea and Iraq, while more than half                               
of all refugees arriving in Greece originate from Afghanistan and Syria. In Spain, the                           
majority of refugees come from Morocco, Guinea and Mali. 
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  Relevant reports​. 
  Asylum ​.​  ​  Children and Youth ​.​ ​ ​  Immigration Detention ​.​ ​ ​  Mobile EU citizens​ .  
Human Rights Watch: No Escape From Hell  
This ​report details the human rights abuses documented by HRW researchers in four                         
migrant detention centres in Libya. It describes inhumane conditions, including the use of                         
extreme violence by guards, and the mistreatment of children. The report highlights how                         
the EU’s cooperation with the Libyan Coast Guard contribute to this cycle of extreme abuse. 
Hungarian Helsinki Committee: Crossing a Red Line – How EU Countries Undermine the                         
Right to Liberty by Expanding the Use of Detention of Asylum Seekers upon Entry  
The Hungarian Helsinki Committee conducted research on the de facto detention of asylum                         
seekers in Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy. Their ​report looks at the statistics, different                           
forms of detention, legal grounds and the political motivation of these practices. It provides                           
recommendations to properly regulate and limit asylum seekers’ deprivation of liberty. 
Migration Policy Group: Piloting one-stop-shop citizenship campaigns for mobile EU citizens                     
- Evaluation and lessons learned for practitioners 
MPG evaluated a pilot model for one-stop shops for ‘citizens campaigns’, promoting the                         
political participation of mobile EU citizens. Together with national partner NGOs this pilot                         
was executed in Ireland, the UK and Belgium. The ​report provides recommendations on how                           
to inform and promote political participation amongst mobile EU citizens.  
  EU Funding opportunities​. 
  Inclusion ​.​  ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Children and Youth ​. 
Calls for proposals - EU funding 
● REC-RCIT-CITI-AG-2019​: Call for proposals to improve the awareness on EU citizenship rights                       
and inclusion of mobile EU citizens  
o​  ​ ​Call out on 15.01.2019 – Deadline: 11.04.2019 
● REC-RRAC-RACI-AG-2019​: Call for proposals to prevent and combat racism, xenophobia,                   
homophobia and other forms of intolerance and to monitor, prevent and counter hate                         
speech online 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 31.01.2019 – Deadline: 24.04.2019 
● REC-RCHI-PROF-AG-2019​: Call for proposals on capacity-building in the area of rights of the                         
child and child-friendly justice 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 15.01.2019 – Deadline: 14.05.2019 
● ISFP-2018-AG-SMUGG​: Smuggling 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 13.12.2018 – Deadline: 28.05.2019 
● REC-RDAP-GBV-AG-2019: Call for proposals to prevent and combat all forms of violence                       
against children, young people and women 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 15.01.2019 – Deadline: 13.06.2019 
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● REC-RDIS-DISC-AG-2019​: Call for proposals to promote the effective implementation of the                     
principle of non-discrimination 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 13.12.2018 – Deadline: 20.06.2019 
Other opportunities 
Strategic Legal Fund for Vulnerable Young Migrants​ (UK only). ILPA; Deadline 01.03.19 
EPIM Call for Proposals - “Unlocking Alternatives”​; Deadline 04.04.2019 
Documenting Human Migrations​. National Geographic Society; Deadline 10.04.19 
 
 EU CALENDAR: UPCOMING EVENTS 
 
European Council and Council of the European Union 
  7-8 March  JHA Council 
  21-22 March  European Council 
European Parliament 
  25-27 February  LIBE Committee Meetings 
  11-14 March  EP Plenary 
  18 & 21 March  LIBE Committee Meetings 
Other events 
  28 February  ORAMMA Final Project Event,​ ORAMMA  
  6 March  Family reunification under the Dublin Regulation​, EPC 
  21 March 
Transformations in Migrants’ Access to Social Protection​, IEMed 
   25-29 March 




This document provides a focused analysis of recent EU level policy-making, legislation and jurisprudence                           
relevant to EPIM’s sub-funds on (1) Immigration detention; (2) Reforming the European Asylum System;                           
(3) Children and Youth on the Move; (4) Mobile EU citizens and (5) Building Inclusive European Societies and                                 
covers the period from 14 December 2018 to 25 February 2019. We kindly ask the readers to keep in mind that                                         
the present Policy Update is composed of a selection of documents and does not claim to be exhaustive. 
Should you, as representatives from EPIM’s Partner Foundations or EPIM-supported organisations, have                       
questions related to the analysis provided in this document or on EU developments in the field of migration                                   
and integration in general, you are invited to contact the authors ( ​k.bamberg@epc.eu ​, ​m.desomer@epc.eu ​,,                         
i.vanbrouwershaven@epc.eu ​). The sole responsibility for the content lies with the author(s) and the content                           
may not necessarily reflect the positions of EPIM, NEF or EPIM’s Partner Foundations. 
For more information on EPIM, please visit ​www.epim.info ​. 
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